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Abstract 
For three decades new social movements have undergone scrutiny from political 
scientists with much written about why social movements exist and how they attract 
members. However little has been done on the influence of these mass mobilisations. In 
this paper I investigate normative and empirical statements about social movements in 
order to develop a way to measure the influence of these phenomenon. Current social 
movement literature provides few tools that can be used to measure social movement 
influence. I will argue that the influence of mass mobilisations on the political realm can 
be measured using discourse analysis techniques and by looking to public policy 
literature. I will then test this methodology by looking at the influence of the New 
Zealand women’s movement on debates surrounding child care and unpaid work. 
 
Introduction 
In societies where the health of democracy is often gauged by the ability of citizens to 
have a say in the decisions affecting them, the whole system is undermined by mass 
disengagement. This leads to attempts to ‘rescue’ modern democracies through claims 
that citizens are engaged with politics but not in the traditional ways. People are not 
joining political parties but they are involved with mass mobilisations like the 
environmental and women’s movements. Democratisation in this sense is largely seen as 
a matter of the progressive inclusion of various groups in political life1 even if that 
political involvement is outside mainstream political institutions. While it is yet to be 
proved that citizens are actively engaging in greater numbers in social movement activity, 
neither do we know whether social movements influence democratic decision-making? In 
this paper I will look at democracy in terms of responsiveness2 and evaluate the role of 
social movements as carriers of citizens’ voices in light of this. If social movements are 
seen as an important supplement (or a favoured alternative) to political parties, outcomes 
from democratic processes should reflect their involvement in the decision-making 
process. As Melucci notes: 
A new political space is designed beyond the traditional distinction  
between state and "civil society": an intermediate public space, whose  
function is not to institutionalise the movement nor to transform them  
into parties but to make society hear their message and translate these  
messages into political decision making, while movements maintain their 
autonomy.3 
 
Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movements 
Social movements exist in society on the political landscape with other forms of 
collective action, but they are set apart by a number of factors from other actors such as 
political parties, interest group (including advocacy groups and lobby groups), and 
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counter-movements. Social movements are collectives of individuals and groups who 
share a common cognitive praxis (one in opposition to dominant norms) and who use 
unconventional forms of action and structures at least some of the time to bring social 
change. While social movements are forms of collective action with distinct 
characteristics, the divisions between the various collectives found in democracies are not 
impenetrable. Individuals and small groups of actors from within a social movement can 
create or join interest groups or political parties, and vice versa. Individual actors may 
even exist in several different collectives at one time. The only mutually exclusive realms 
are those of counter-movements and social movements, as one has appeared in reaction 
and opposition to the other. (See figure 1) 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As already touched upon the type of political and social action taken by social 
movements is one factor that sets them apart from other political actors. Social 
movements use non-institutional or unconventional modes of action in their attempts to 
force social change. The non-institutionalised tactics of movements has two distinct parts. 
The first is that social movement action is directed outside the realm of formal politics, 
parties, and government. These disaffected groups use tactics such as protests, boycotts, 
slogan painting, sit-ins, grass-roots meetings, and revolutions to bring social change. The 
notion of non-institutional tactics also suggests the actions are not governed by rules and 
norms, it is the idea that social movements somehow erupt spontaneously. 4 In contrast, 
political parties and interest groups are forms of collective action that work within the 
existing political system, use more established and formal structures, and rely on a range 
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of institutional tactics such as negotiations, letter writing, petitions, and lobbying in order 
to bring social change. These points of distinction do not totally separate social 
movements from more formal collectives. A social movement may seek the support of a 
political party or government to have changes enacted through laws. As John Dryzek sees 
it activities by social movements often take place in civil society but result in democratic 
power being exercised over the state.5 There is acknowledgement within democratic 
representation literature that good democratic decision-making is reliant on activity from 
both the political and civic realms.6 
 
Another feature of social movements found in existing definitions is that they are 
collectives of groups and individuals who share a common discourse or identity. Social 
movements are seen as both creators of new knowledge and challengers of the dominant 
codes of society7 Eyerman and Jamison note that it is the movement’s cognitive praxis 
that distinguishes one movement from another and what gives a social movement its 
significance for broader social processes.8 For example, the women’s movement is a 
collective of numerous individuals and groups who share a grievance about the 
oppression of women which is encoded in dominant cultural norms. In this respect, being 
a member or a non-member of the women’s movement refers to an ideational 
commitment.9 
 
So what groups found in modern democracies fit the definition of collectives form around 
distinctive discourses (rejecting dominant norms) that uses non-institutional tactics and 
informal structures in order to bring about social change? Ian Marsh sets out nine ‘issues 
movements’ which he says have emerged in Western democracies since 1960s: women’s, 
peace, environment, consumer, gay rights, animal liberation, ethnic, racial minority and 
‘New Right’ movements.10 Such a list should be taken as a snap shot of movements 
existing at a particular place and time, as the landscape for non-institutional action to 
bring social change is not static. Any definition for use in empirical investigations of 
social movement influence must be tight enough to delineate between movements and 
other forms of collective action, but not so static as to prevent acknowledgement of 
changes in the landscape of collective action. Collectives may generate new social 
movements from recognition of new grievances. Existing movements may cease to exist. 
If all organisations and individuals associated with a social movement shift from use of 
non-institutional tactics and forms to work completely within the existing political 
system, they change their status from social movement to that of an interest group. One 
of the most difficult things about investigations of social movements is the very fact that 
they keep changing necessarily making empirical inquiries historically contingent. 
However in order to further empirical investigations of social movement influence the 
subject of inquiries should focus on collective citizen activity that falls outside the rubric 
of state politics at least some of the time and that challenge the existing social discourses.  
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There are a number of arenas which social movement’s target in order to bring social 
change: 
 
Figure 2 
Targets of social movement action 
Internal targets 
• the movement organisation 
• the movement actors 
 
External targets 
• the culture of society 
• the political system/state 
 
When looking to measure the influence of social movements it is the external targets that 
will prove most worthwhile. Internal changes to a social movement operations and on 
citizens participating in collective action are important, but it is the influence of these 
mass mobilisations on the rest of the society which is of concern when looking at social 
movements as important players in the process of democratic decision-making. I will 
focus on the ‘political’ impact of social movements, as political influence would result in 
the ends of the social movement action being binding on the wider community. In 
particular this paper I will focus on social movement interactions with the state/political 
system. This focus on the state may be criticised for ignoring movements’ consciousness 
raising efforts. However it is clear that some of the attention of social movements is 
aimed at changing public policy and legislation, and these changes require state support 
to succeed.11 
 
New actors, new policy, and new meanings 
In this next section I will explore three types of political gains sought by social 
movements in order to determine where to focus empirical investigations of social 
movement influence over the political system/state. Mass mobilisations seek three 
political outcomes: 
 
Figure 3 
Three forms of political influence 
Participatory gains - elite acceptance of new actors 
 
Material gains -  elite acceptance of new policy 
 
Discursive gains - elite acceptance of new meanings 
 
Two of the forms of political influence can be found in the work of William Gamson who 
sees collective action ‘success’ as a being linked to participatory and material 
outcomes.12 The participatory gains would result in the acceptance of social movements 
into the political decision-making processes as legitimate representatives of previously 
underrepresented groups of people. In Schumaker’s work this is encompassed by the 
concepts of access responsiveness, that is the willingness of the target to hear the 
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concerns of the movement organization; and agenda responsiveness, the target's 
willingness to place the movement's demands on the political agenda.13 Participatory 
outcomes may result in the creation of a new agency to provide access to the political 
realm to actors previously denied involvement in this realm or it could mean the 
acceptance of social movement actors into public forums and political parties. 
 
There are problems linking social movement influence to success in gaining access to the 
political system because of the conflict between inclusion and autonomy. Inclusion in 
existing institutions of democracy changes the very nature of social movements from that 
of 'outsider' to 'insider' groups. As already noted, social movements are distinct forms of 
collective action partly due to their use of non-institutional tactics and forms. Once a 
challenging group is accepted or included in decision-making it is no longer a 
challenging group.14 The tension created by inclusion in the political realm is noted by 
Jamison et al in a study of the environmental movement in Europe: 
The movement was subject to the pull of incorporation from other  
political actors, particularly political parties and other organisations  
of the established political culture creating a tension between this  
incorporation and autonomy.15 
Institutionalisation has been seen as an instrument of social control and inclusion in the 
political process signals attempts by political elites to co-opt challenging groups. For this 
reason it seems prudent to leave aside participatory gains as a measure of social 
movement influence. 
 
The second part of Gamson's measures of success is based on gauging whether 
movements have gained new advantages for their constituencies.16 This type of goal can 
be considered as a substantive aim of social movements. Substantive ‘success’ involves 
changes in policies in response to challenge and can either be proactive (implying the 
introduction of ‘new advantages’) or it can be reactive (implying prevention of ‘new 
disadvantages’).17 Such gains include legislative and policy changes or redistribution of 
resources to benefit the social movement constituency. Material gains are also discussed 
by Schumaker who notes that success may be measured against policy responsiveness, 
the target's adoption of new policies (particularly legislation) congruent with the manifest 
demands of protest groups; output responsiveness, the target's effective implementation 
of its new policies; and impact responsiveness, the degree to which the actions of the 
political system succeed in alleviating the grievances of the protest group.18 
 
There are problems with using substantive gains as the only measure of social movement 
influence. First, investigation of social movement influence can easily miss subtle or 
unintended changes brought about by social movements.19 Second, investigations of 
material gains would be time consuming as social movement actors seek dozens of 
different substantive changes over time. Social movements are not coherent institutions 
focused on a single material goal, they are a collection of actors and groups sharing a 
common identity but with multiple substantive aims. This is evident within the women’s 
movement where actors may share a common identity based on a desire to improve the 
lives of women, but disagree on how improvements will be brought about. For example, 
some activists in the women’s movement see child care as essential to improving 
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women’s lives, while others claim improvements will be achieved through motherhood 
payments which allow women to stay in the home and care for their children. 
 
The third gain sought by social movements and discussed in existing sociology and 
political science literature is discursive advantage. Social movements are not just fighting 
for increased participation in decision-making, nor for material gains, they are fighting 
for different meanings and orientations to be adopted by society. The discursive impact of 
social movements is often investigated in terms of the impact of movement ‘frames’ on 
individuals taking a part in the mass mobilisation.20 Understanding the concept of 
framing as a way to convince individuals to participate in social protest is in part tied to 
the origins of the concept. Social movement literature has based its concept on the work 
of  Erving Goffman who used framing to explain the actions of individuals not groups in 
society.21 A focus on changes to the narratives used by individual citizens participating in 
social movement activity does not provide insight into the influence of the phenomenon 
over political decision-making. What is needed is to take a wider view of the role of 
frames in social movement action.  
 
Social movements are involved in battles for cognitive space, fights for cultural stakes 
and for different meanings to be adopted. In this sense social movements attempt to 
change the frames of politicians, bureaucrats, the media, and members of the public not 
just those of social movement activists and potential activists. Zald acknowledges that 
competitive examination of the impact and outcomes of movements on culture and 
frames, as well as on policy, would be extraordinarily valuable. When and how 
movements’ add to or change the cultural stock are important dimensions in 
understanding social change in general.22 There have been limited attempts to show the 
impact of social movements on public discourses.  For example, Myra Marx Ferree used 
a concept of success based on changes in the collective consciousness in three arenas: 
political and policy outcomes, mobilisation outcomes, and cultural outcomes.23  While 
Barbara Hobson looked at the way women's collectives in Scandinavia and Sweden 
impacted upon discourse.24 Looking at discursive impact of social movements does tie in 
with the definition of movements as discursive actors using unconventional tactics to 
bring about social change and it is a plausible goal against which to measure the 
influence of mass mobilisations in democratic decision-making. 
 
A focus on language does not discount the other gains sought by social movements – 
participatory and material gains – but can in part encompass both.  Social movement 
actors incorporated into the formal political structures of a democracy may assist in 
attempts to change the dominant discourses by helping to transfer social movement 
knowledge into this realm.  An investigation of discursive influence may help to highlight 
the role of these boundary-spanning actors in decision-making. An investigation of 
discursive influence may also locate instances of material gain, as many of these gains 
will be found in the narratives of legislation and other written policy documents. 
 
The assertion that it is possible to measure the discursive influence of social movements 
raises a methodological problem; How to show that the actions of the social movement 
caused the change in the political arena?  This is a well-known problem in social science, 
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the existence of such a close relationship between a set of variables that it is hard to 
identify cause and effect. 25 One solution to the problem of causality is offered by 
Hanspeter Kriesi:   
We have to make the link between the movement’s action and the  
observed change indirectly, by specifying the mechanisms through  
which the former produces the latter.” 26 
In the case of discursive impact it is the very process of public debate that provides the 
mechanisms through which collectives assert discursive influence. It is the interaction 
between multiple actors in the decision making process that provides a way in which 
social movements can change the frames of other actors in the policy realm. Policy 
formation is not a one way street, it is an interaction and policy oriented learning is seen 
as the motor of change in public policy. 27 This interaction does not have to be on a face 
to face basis. As Dryzek notes communicative power is diffuse and pervasive, felt in the 
way terms are defined and issues are framed, not in the direct leverage of one actor over 
another.28 
 
Earlier I discounted investigations of participatory gains by social movements due to the 
fear that formal inclusion of mass mobilisations within decision-making bodies may 
signal state co-option of the challenging group rather than genuine influence. It is 
important to look at whether discourses, as well as political actors, can be co-opted by the 
existing political elites in attempts to prevent further disruptive action. In social 
movement literature the generation of discourses is seen as a strategic effort by groups of 
people to fashion understandings of the world and themselves, as well as an effort to 
legitimate and motivate collective action.29 If social movement actors are able to use 
frames strategically, then it is possible for political elites to practice discursive co-option. 
However framing is not only a conscious action, it is also a subconscious activity. As 
Goffman asserts individuals apply frames automatically and are unaware of the organised 
features of the frameworks they applied to situations. 
It seems we can hardly glance at anything without applying a primary  
framework, thereby forming conjectures about what occurred before  
and the expectation of what is likely to happen now.30 
Frames exert powerful influence over what we see and how we interpret what we see, 
they belong to the taken-for-granted world of policy making, we are usually unaware of 
their role in organising our actions, thoughts, and perceptions.31 Any methodology used 
to measure discursive influence must be able to detect strategic use of language by all 
political actors, as well as the unconsciously applied primary frames within narratives. I 
will address this issue later in the paper, by looking at ways to categorise deconstructed 
texts which draw out the layers of frames used by political actors. 
 
As long as the issue of discursive co-option is kept in mind during the development of a 
methodology, it is clear that focusing on social movement influence over public policy 
discourse provides a way forward in measuring social movement impact. Such a focus 
implies that language can shape the world. While I do not believe that language is all 
there is, I agree with Yee that languages restrict or authorise, priorities and distribute the 
ideas and beliefs that policy makers can think and in doing so partly delimit policies they 
can pursue.32 For example, labelling an item on the political agenda as being a public or 
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private matter results in private issues being left outside the realm of public 
accountability.33 Social movements can bring about change in the world by altering the 
language used in the political realm. As Melucci notes conflict in society assumes the 
form of a symbolic challenges that publicise novel dilemmas and problems and this leads 
to the generations of new definitions of freedom and the recognition of new rights and 
responsibilities.34 
 
This paper now turns to develop a methodology that allows attention to be focussed on 
the process of policy making as a discursive struggle to name problems and solutions. 
Any such methodology must find a way to draw out the different discourses used in the 
policy debates and the social practices under which those frames are constructed and 
changed. 
 
Coalitions, discourses, and change 
One tool already used to measure the discursive impact of social movements within 
public policy debates is the advocacy coalition framework of Paul Sabatier.35 As 
described by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith the advocacy coalition framework requires a 
perspective of at least ten years, a focus on policy subsystems, an intergovernmental 
dimension and the conceptualisation of public policy based upon a belief system capable 
of establishing value priorities and causal assumptions.36 The advocacy coalition 
framework aggregates the multiplicity of actors involved in public policy debates into 
coalitions based on common beliefs. As Sabatier sees it advocacy coalitions are 
composed of politicians, agency officials, interest group leaders, and intellectuals who 
share a set of normative and causal beliefs on policy issues. 37 This aggregation of actors 
around shared beliefs fits neatly with definitions of social movements as collectives 
sharing a common cognitive praxis.  
 
The problem with the advocacy coalition framework is that Sabaiter asserts that 
coalitions are groups of people “who show a nontrivial degree of co-ordinated activity 
over time.”38 As defined earlier social movements are networks that use non-institutional 
tactics and forms to bring about social change. It is difficult to show that these non-
institutionalised collectives (found between the political and civil realms) have had non-
trivial levels of contact with the institutionalised actors responsible for making legislation 
and public policy. In order to encompass the non-institutional nature of social movements 
I will turn instead to Maarten Hajer’s concept of discourse coalitions to scrutinise the 
influence of social movements over public policy narratives. Similar to advocacy 
coalitions, discourse coalitions are groups of actors who share a social construct, however 
there is no emphasis on the co-ordinated interaction of those who share a cognitive 
praxis.39 This concept of a discourse coalition is useful when looking at the discursive 
impact of sustained social protests because it fits with the definition of social movements 
as an aggregation of actors around a social construct. Therefore it will allow 
identification of any social movements involved in public policy debates, the first step in 
any attempts to measure social movement influence over public narratives. 
 
An investigation of discourse coalitions would begin with a close analysis of written texts 
to map out the narratives that exist in a particular area of public policy decision-making. 
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A discourse is an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is 
given to a phenomenon, a story line through which actors make sense of the world. A 
wide range of texts must be selected for analysis of social movement influence on public 
policy. Any analysis would require deconstruction of public documents from 
organisations and actors, such as state agencies, politicians, social movement actors, the 
media, and counter-movements. Sabatier advocates the use of public documents in order 
to analyse the coalitions that exist in public policy debates: 
Given the rather technical nature of many secondary aspects and  
the focus on changes in beliefs over a decade or more, content analysis  
of government documents (e.g., legislative and administrative hearings)  
and interest-group publication probably offer the best prospects for  
systematic empirical work on changes in elite beliefs.40  
Not only must the documents used for the close analysis come from a wide range of 
sources, they must cover a wide time frame. Any discursive changes that occur in public 
policy are likely to evolve slowly and as such, investigations of such shifts must cover at 
least ten years. The first reading of these written texts would involve an examination of 
the detailed phrases and words within which researchers must look for: Common textual 
patterns and features; Common assumptions; Common character representations; and 
common ways of using conventional resources.41 
 
The deconstruction of texts allows researchers to map the various discourses found in a 
public policy debate but it will not identify whether a social movement discourse 
coalition existed or whether this coalition influenced the dominant narratives of the 
political system/state. As Hajer notes the analysis must go beyond investigation of 
differences of opinion of technical facts and must look at the social practices from which 
social constructs emerge and in which the actors that make these statements engage.42 
Implicit in social movement literature is the idea that many public policy disputes involve 
a discourse adhered to by a social movement, as well as a dominant discourse with a set 
of beliefs to which the actors of the mass mobilisation are opposed. Social movements 
are seen to raise cultural challenges to the dominant language, to the codes that organise 
information and shape social practices.43 Before looking for any influence by social 
movements on the discourse of the political system/state we need to identify if a social 
movement discourse coalition exists. To locate the discourse coalitions that exist within 
the political debates, the documents will be reread and actors grouped together in 
coalitions according to their use of common discursive traits. 
 
The next step is to investigate whether social movement discourses were adopted by 
other political actors, such as those involved in state agencies, the media, academia, and 
the general population. In order to find out if a social movement discourse coalition has 
been influential over other discourse coalitions researchers must look for changes in the 
composition of the coalitions and also look to see which of the narratives is 
‘institutionalised’ by actors of the political system/state. Hajer argues that the key to 
success is the ability of discourse coalitions to imbed their linguistic categories in the 
structure of the methodologies and practices that shape and guide everyday policy 
deliberation.44 Institutionalisation may be a durable resource for social movements as it 
protects gains.45 Influence by social movements will be evident if other political actors 
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(particularly actors from within the existing political system/state) join the discourse 
coalition of the mass mobilisation. 
 
Social movements may have institutional actors picking up their narratives but does this 
mean real discursive influence?  As noted earlier actors can use frames strategically, and 
it is possible that social movement discourses will be adopted by state actors in an 
attempt to shut down any challenges to the status quo and not to bring real change.  In 
order to try to detect this discursive co-option I will draw on concepts from Sabatier's 
advocacy coalition framework. Sabatier asserts that some aspects of public policy clearly 
change far more frequently than others.   To get a conceptual handle of this Sabatier 
divides policy into three belief systems – core, public, and secondary aspect beliefs. 46   
The first category is deep core beliefs.  These are the normative concepts or worldviews 
found in the cognitive praxes of each coalition.  The second, policy core beliefs are those 
ideas which are central to the policy views, such as who is responsible for childcare and 
why childcare is necessary. The final category is that of secondary aspects of public 
policy.  These are the beliefs on how the policies surrounding childcare should be 
implemented. In particular it is the division between core and policy beliefs that will be 
useful when trying to gauge the influence of  social movements. The most desirable 
discursive influence for mass mobilisations would be the adoption of the movements core 
beliefs by other actors. I will now turn to two case studies in order to test the theory and 
methodology set out in this paper.  The cases focus on the influence of the women’s 
movement in two areas of public debate in New Zealand. 
 
The women’s movement in action in New Zealand 
The first of the case studies looks at the involvement of the New Zealand women’s 
movement in debates over childcare from 1970 to 1999.47 This issue was chosen as the 
public debates have involved both members of women’s organisations and actors from 
the state/political system. For example the concern over childcare can be found in a 
Parliamentary Select Committee Submission made by the National Organisation of 
Women in 1990:  
Career choices, childcare, and women’s education have all been  
addressed by the Council at various times and in various forums.   
No one of these measures is sufficient in itself.  But each has its  
place if all New Zealanders are to have the opportunity for full and  
free development.48  
State actors were involved in monitoring the quality of day-care through child care centre 
regulations, as well as the provision funding for capital works, staff training, and 
subsidies for parents using carers outside the home. 
 
The second case centres on the measurement and valuation of unpaid work, that is all 
services and productive activities outside the formal economy that could have been done 
by a third person without changing their utility to members of the household.49 This 
definition of unpaid work excludes tasks performed voluntarily for charities, clubs, and 
other organisations. As with debates on child care, unpaid work was chosen for analysis 
as the topic has been debated by both members of women’s organisations  and state 
actors over the past 30 years: 
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All feminist theory has identified the crucial role of women’s unpaid labour in the 
household and, to a lesser extent, in the community.  (p. 13 NZUPW 22) 
 
This government has a strong commitment to valuing women’s unpaid work and 
this has been clearly recognised in a number of policy initiatives, perhaps most 
notably in the area of early childhood care and education and the policy direction 
taken on the issue of superannuation.50 
The choice of unpaid work in an investigation of the discursive impact of the women’s 
movement is prudent as it is predominantly a battle over definitions and narratives. 
 
In order to establish what discourses were used in New Zealand childcare and unpaid 
work debates, I carried out a close analysis of 181 public documents on childcare and 110 
documents on the measurement of unpaid productive activity. While the documents 
chosen are by no means an exhaustive set of documents on childcare and unpaid work in 
New Zealand, they included government reports, press releases, women’s organisation 
newsletters, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, submission to Select Committees, 
presentations to public forums, academic papers, and reports from State Agencies and 
Government Departments. Also examined were selections taken at three-year intervals 
from Hansard Parliamentary Debates and the New Zealand feminist magazine 
“Broadsheet”. As noted earlier, any close analysis aimed at tracing the coalitions that 
exist in public policy debates must cover a wide time frame (one of at least a decade) and 
multiple sources. 
 
Feminists debate child care and unpaid work 
The first step was to locate whether there was an identifiable feminist discourse in 
debates on child care and unpaid work in New Zealand between 1970 and 1999. In terms 
of the child care discussions, a feminist discourse was particularly evident in 
documentation of the 1970s and centred on the provision of free 24-hour childcare so 
women could work, rest, and play unencumbered by children. 
 
Figure 4 
Women have a right to equality: Feminism and Child Care  
Deep Core 
Women have a right to equality in both the public and private spheres. Motherhood is 
socially constructed. Women are oppressed by cultural and social conventions.  
 
Policy Core 
Parents should have access to free 24-hour childcare. Childcare is needed so women can 
work, rest, study, and play. The community has a responsibility to care for children. The 
Government has an active role to play in providing real choice for women. There should 
be more sharing of childcare duties between men and women.  
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In terms of unpaid work a broad feminist discourse was evident throughout the 30 years 
of debates scrutinised. This feminist discourse contained assumptions about the value of 
unpaid work and its status as ‘productive activity’.  
We believe it has become an obvious and well-known fact that in our society the 
job of childrearing and caring for the home has a very low rating both socially and 
economically.51 
 
Women are assumed to undertake the duties of domestic worker, unpaid of 
course.  If women did not perform these duties, real wages would have to rise to 
allow for the purchase of these services or employers would have to supply them, 
with resulting loss of profits.52 
 
Figure 5 
Every woman is a working woman: Feminism and Unpaid Work 
Deep Core 
Women have a right to choice. The world is partiarchally dominated. Work is any 
productive activity. 
 
Policy Core 
Unpaid work must be assigned monetary value and statistical significance. Women must 
be paid for unpaid work so they can have real choices in life. The opposite of paid 
employment is unpaid work. 
 
The existence of these feminist discourses does not confirm that the women’s movement 
was active in New Zealand during the three decades of public deliberations being 
investigated. While a common cognitive praxis is part of what makes a social movement, 
the groups involved in the collective must use unconventional forms of action or 
structures at least some of the time in their attempts to bring social change. In this respect 
it was necessary to look at the discourse coalitions that formed around the feminist 
discourses. This involved mapping out which actors in New Zealand used the two 
feminist frames found in debates on child care and unpaid work. In terms of child care it 
was clear that actors from groups which used unconventional action and structures were 
the main proponents of the feminist discourse in the 1970s. Included in a list of 17 
organisation who were part of the feminist discourse coalition were Women’s Liberation 
organisations, the United Women’s Convention, the Working Women’s Council, the 
Society for Research on Women, and the Women’s Electoral Lobby. While these groups 
varied in the extent of their institutional organisation and actions, many had 
unconventional grass roots structures and used non-institutional tactics to push for social 
change. In the debates on the measurement of unpaid work similar organisations involved 
in the feminist discourse coalition. In the 1970s debates over the valuation of unpaid 
productive activity there were 14 different groups were involved in the feminist discourse 
coalition. Included in this coalition were the National Organisation of Women, the 
Society for Research on Women, the United Women’s Convention, Broadsheet 
contributors, and the Federation of University Women. Again many of these women’s 
organisations used tactics such as demonstrations and rallies to push for social change, 
and were organisations with unconventional structures and methods of operation.  
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So using a discourse coalition approach allowed identification of the women’s movement 
in debates of child care and unpaid work in New Zealand, but can it show whether this 
movement was influential in the public policy debates. Gaining a view of the influence of 
the women’s movement must start with an investigation highlighting the other actors 
involved in the feminist discourse coalitions between 1970 and 1999. Hajer’s argument is 
that success for a social movement would be the institutionalising of their narratives. 
Influence by the women’s movement would see members of mainstream state institutions 
joining the feminist discourse coalitions found in unpaid work and child care debates. 
 
Marginalising women’s issues 
An analysis of the core and policy beliefs about childcare in New Zealand between 1970 
and 1999 showed the use of feminist frames by a very small number of women MPs, the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and a few individual bureaucrats. But there is no evidence 
of large scale involvement in the feminist discourse coalition by government ministers or 
state agencies. As central government controls policy making on childcare in New 
Zealand, the virtual absence of its key actors from the women’s movement discourse 
coalition meant the feminist core beliefs lack real power between 1970 and 1999. This 
lack of acceptance of the feminist narratives is discussed by Helen Cook:  
The lack of acceptance of core feminist frames by the state in  
New Zealand may be due to the strength of narratives on motherhood  
and gender roles. The politics of childcare is ultimately caught in  
debates focussing on what people believe the roles of men and women  
should be.53  
Similarly with the unpaid work debates, the feminist discourse coalition did not include 
large numbers of government actors and bureaucrats. Of state agencies, it is really only 
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs that throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s used the 
feminist narratives in debates about the measurement and valuation of unpaid household 
duties. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs notes the lack of support from other 
government departments, when it was unable to secure funding from other agencies to 
carry out time use surveys.54  
 
While the Ministry is a state agency its position is somewhat different from other state 
actors, as it was established in 1984 as a state advocate of women’s needs.55 The fact that 
it is the Ministry of Women’s Affairs which takes a place in the feminist discourse 
coalition along side women’s movement activists is in this respect not surprising, nor 
evidence of wider state/ political system acceptance of feminist narratives. In fact I would 
argue that leaving this topic with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs means valuation of 
unpaid work and child care is seen as a ‘women’s issue’ only and not part of mainstream 
policy making.  
 
The Ministry of Women’s Affairs was part of the feminist discourse coalition during the 
early discussion of both child care and unpaid work but this involvement with women’s 
movement coalition wanes in the case of child care deliberations. In discussions on child 
care from 1970 to 1999, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is involved in three different 
discourse coalitions found within the documents analysed. As already noted  the Ministry 
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involves itself in the feminist discourse coalition in the years immediately following its 
inception.  By the late 1980s the Ministry is arguing childcare is needed to protect 
children’s rights and is relatively silent on women’s rights. Then in the 1990s the 
Ministry sees child care as essential to protect all workers’ rights. The Ministry staff may 
have deliberately chosen to shift into the child and worker rights discourse coalitions, but 
tracing the motives for such action would require interviews with Ministry staff and is 
outside the scope of this paper. The difference between the discourses used by the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs when child care and unpaid work deliberations are 
investigated side by side may in part lie with the different nature of the policy debates 
analysed. Child care involves the redistribution of goods, while unpaid work is a 
discursive and non-distributive debate.  
 
While the women’s movement did not have power over the majority of state actors in 
child care and unpaid work deliberations, it was not totally powerless either. During the 
30 years studied there was evidence of feminist discourses on child care and unpaid work 
being adopted by unions, sector groups and academics.56 The close analysis of public 
texts on child care showed no involvement by unions and sector groups in the feminist 
discourse coalition in the 1970s. Then from 1979 unions and sector groups taking part in 
the debates on child care joined the feminist discourse coalition. Similarly in debates on 
unpaid work, women’s movement activists dominate the feminist discourse coalition in 
the 1970s, but during the 1980s and 1990s academics and a small number of unions join 
this coalition. A network analysis tracing the movement of individual feminist women’s 
might show that it was the involvement of individual feminists in unions and academic 
that brought about the movement of these organisation s into the feminist discourse 
coalitions. However, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The lack of social movement influence over the core beliefs of actors from the 
state/political system is in part predicted within Sabatier's work on advocacy coalitions. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian note that changes to core beliefs are considered extremely 
difficult to achieve, with any adaptation seen as being “akin to a religious conversion”.57 
However Sabatier and Mazmanian’s assertions only hold when looking for changes in 
beliefs in line with the narratives of the women’s movement. For the core and policy 
beliefs of the actors involved in child care and unpaid work debates were not static 
between 1970 and 1999.  A number of changes in discourse coalitions were detected in 
the close analysis of child care and unpaid work debates. The first step is to locate the 
other discourses that were part of these deliberations, and then to look at the membership 
of the coalitions that used each or the core and policy beliefs. 
 
Patriarchy, rights, and neo-liberalism 
If social movement literature is correct, then the existence of a discourse coalition 
dominated by women’s movement organisations will signal the existence of a dominant 
discourse coalition to which the feminists were opposed. Discourses centred on 
patriarchal beliefs were found to be part of the New Zealand debates of childcare and 
unpaid work between 1970 and 1999. In the child care debates the patriarchal discourse 
saw care by mothers as being the most ‘natural’ and ‘normal’58 and day-care outside the 
home was applicable only for those families with special needs. As the Department of 
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Labour notes in 1987 childcare was allowed for sick mothers, solo mothers, and families 
where women worked due to financial pressures on the family. 59  
 
Figure 6 
Women are natural carers: Patriarchy and Child Care  
Deep Core 
Nuclear families are essential for society.  Childcare is not suitable for pre-schoolers. A 
good mother cares for her own children. Women are natural carers.  
 
Policy Core 
Women only work outside the home due to economic necessity. Childcare is a welfare 
issue and care outside the home should only be provided in cases of extreme need. A lack 
of mother-care for young children results in social problems later.   
 
In unpaid work debates it is clear that the status quo found in documents of the 1970s was 
a patriarchal discourse in which work was seen as paid employment and household 
chores were part of the private realm that did not require public reward or recognition.  In 
early census documents adult males would be ‘gainfully employed’ while claiming ‘my 
wife doesn’t work’. 
 
Figure 7 
Male breadwinner/female homemaker: Patriarchy and Unpaid Work 
Deep Core 
Work is paid employment. A woman’s place is in the home. Household chores are a 
responsibility (not work). 
 
Policy Core 
Women perform an important function in the home. Money should be given to married 
couples to ensure women can stay at home. The opposite of work is leisure. 
 
Beyond the 1970s relatively few actors are involved in the two patriarchal discourse 
coalitions. In child care debates of the 1980s there was evidence that actors were moving 
away from the belief that a woman’s place is in the home and by the 1990s no actors used 
the patriarchal core beliefs in debates on childcare. However some of the patriarchal 
beliefs did filter into the social construction at the centre of the third discourse coalition 
detected in New Zealand debates of childcare between 1970 and 1999 – the child rights 
discourse. 
  
Figure 8 
Children must be well cared for and education: Child Rights and Child Care 
Deep Core 
Children have a right to quality care. Children have a right to quality education.  
Childcare is about protecting the welfare of children. 
 
Policy Core 
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Childcare is about education of young children. Childcare must care for the minds of 
children. The state should regulate the operation of childcare centres. Children deserve 
quality care no matter what the financial position of their parents.  
 
There were two parts to their child-centred discourse, a concern for the welfare of 
children and a desire to provide better education standards.  These two were intertwined 
from 1978 to 1987 in New Zealand with the concept of ‘educare’ that dominates the 
discourses of state agencies and government departments.  While children’s rights 
dominated this child-centred narratives, it is a pragmatic approach to the existence of 
‘working-women’ that was central to the fourth discourse found in debates on childcare. 
 
Figure 9 
Working Parents Need Support: Workers Rights and Child Care 
Deep Core 
Childcare is a right for all working parents. Paid employment is a right for all New 
Zealanders.   
 
Policy Core 
Employers and the state have a role to play in providing childcare.  Solo parents have to 
return to the workforce for economic survival.  Childcare funding should be provided for 
all working parents.  
 
The final storyline found in New Zealand childcare debates from 1970 to 1999 was the 
neo-liberal discourse that appeared towards the end of the 1980s. The neo-liberal social 
construct was based on a belief that individuals have an obligation to work and provide 
adequate care for their own families. 
Figure 10 
Individuals must care for their own families: Neo-liberals and Child Care  
Deep Core 
New Zealanders have an obligation to provide for their own well being. Parents are 
responsible for the care and education of their children. 
 
Policy Core 
The market will provide childcare facilities if there is a demonstrated need. Employees 
should negotiate childcare as part of their employment contracts. Cost-benefit analyses 
should be applied to childcare facilities. Parents should be provided with the tools to care 
for their own children. 
 
A discourse based on neo-liberal beliefs is also evident in debates about the valuation of 
unpaid work between 1970 and 1999. While actors who used the neo-liberal discourse in 
unpaid work debates admitted that “activities” go on outside the labour force, the 
underlying assumption is constant – work is paid employment, everything else was “not 
work”. 
• How many hours did you work last week? 
Do not include any unpaid work you did other than that in a family business.60 
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Figure 11 
All adults should part in paid employment: Neoliberals and Unpaid Work 
Deep Core 
Working is the normal state for all adults. Work is paid employment. 
 
Policy Core 
Voluntary labour is a step towards paid employment. Women should be in the labour 
force, except when caring for young children. Unpaid work should not be part of 
mainstream statistics. 
 
As noted earlier it is necessary to map out which actors adhered to the various discourses 
in order to establish the coalitions involved in child care and unpaid work deliberations. 
Dominant discourse coalitions would be those in which the narratives were 
institutionalised in laws or other state/political system texts. In the case of child care 
discussions, state actors were found predominantly in the child rights discourse coalition 
during the late 1970s. Then in the 1980s its is narratives on workers rights which 
dominate narratives of the state/political system. From 1988 in New Zealand debates on 
childcare it was the neo-liberal core beliefs that dominated the texts produced by state 
actors.61 This move to a neo-liberal values system is also evident in debates on unpaid 
work.  So while Sabatier and Mazmanian may claim that changes in core beliefs are ‘akin 
to religious conversion’ it is clear that state agents did change their beliefs and move into 
new discourse coalitions in deliberations about child care and unpaid work in New 
Zealand. 
 
Conclusion 
A discourse analysis of public text and a focus on the discourse coalitions involved in the 
generation of narratives allows researchers to investigate the influence (or lack of 
influence) of social movements.  As I have demonstrated by looking at two case studies 
in New Zealand, it is possible to establish whether a social movement discourse coalition 
exists in areas of public policy and whether this coalition contains actors from the 
state/political system. What was clear in the two case studies was that the feminist 
discourse coalitions failed to attract into their ranks large numbers of institutional actors, 
the one exception was involvement by the boundary-spanning Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs. It was other discourse coalitions found within the debates of child care and 
unpaid work that were ‘institutionalised’ by the involvement of actors from the existing 
state/political system. 
 
There are two possible explanations for the lack of influence by the feminist discourse 
coalitions, while other coalitions fared better. The first of these centres on the path-
dependency of public policy narratives. In debates on child care, both the neo-liberal and 
child rights discourse coalitions contained beliefs that shifted only marginally from the 
patriarchal narrative which dominated state documents in the early 1970s. The child 
rights and patriarchal narratives both held core beliefs about protecting the welfare of 
children, while the patriarchal and neo-liberal narratives both contained beliefs about the 
importance of the family unit. While parts of the child-centred and neo-liberal frames can 
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be seen as extensions of the core and policy beliefs found within the patriarchal discourse 
coalition of the 1970s, the feminist frames called for a radical departure from the 
dominant core beliefs espoused by state actors in the 1970s. What may have happened in 
the public policy debates of child care in New Zealand is a frame alignment exercise in 
which new beliefs were moulded to fit the existing dominant frame. 
 
In the debates on unpaid work, path dependence was certainly evident in the view of 
statistics that dominated state agencies. Statistics New Zealand continually referred to 
statistics as facts that had to be verifiable and comparable.  This view of statistics meant 
there could be little change in the questions asked from one survey to the next. Phillip S. 
Morrison notes that in order to study change social sciences need an instrument which 
does not change, and instrument such as a questionnaire which asked the same questions 
in the same way over a broad time span.   
Yet, this very stability in questionnaire required to measure change is often 
neither desirable nor possible.  Questions must change in order to be relevant, and 
relevance implies adaptation to the very changes that the data is trying to 
capture.62 
 
Another reason for the attraction of politicians and bureaucrats to the child rights and 
neo-liberal discourse coalitions rather than feminist coalitions, may have been the power 
of the other members of the coalitions. In child care debates the child rights discourse 
coalition (which was strong during the late 1970s and much of the 1980s) was made up of 
‘experts’ from unions, sector groups, and a number of government departments. The 
feminist discourse coalition at the time was made up of ‘outsider’ groups rarely seen as 
experts on childcare. In debates on both child care and the valuation of unpaid work the 
neo-liberal discourse coalition proved popular with state actors in the 1990s and was 
pushed by powerful business elites. These groups may have simply had more power than 
the women’s movement in the bid to change the cultural stock used in debates on child 
care and unpaid work.  
 
Further comparative work would allow for additional conclusions to be drawn about the 
conditions under which social movements were able to encourage other political actors to 
join the discourse coalition founded by the movement. We should continue to look for the 
conditions under which organisations achieve discursive influence.  After all if social 
movements are an alternative way that the public presents its views to decision makers, it 
is important to understand when and how mobilisations exert influence over public policy 
decisions. 
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